

































A Discrete Choice Model of Dividend 
Reinvestment Plans: Classification and Prediction 
 
Thomas P. Boehm and Ramon P. DeGennaro 
 
Working Paper 2007-22 
October 2007  
 
 
Ramon P. DeGennaro gratefully acknowledges the support of a summer research grant from the University of Tennessee’s 
Finance Department. The authors thank participants at a session at the 2007 meetings of the Association of Private Enterprise 
Education for helpful comments. The views expressed here are the authors’ and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. Any remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility. 
 
Please address questions regarding content to Ramon P. DeGennaro, Visiting Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, and 
SunTrust Professor of Finance, Finance Department, University of Tennessee, 423 Stokely Management Center, Knoxville, TN 
37996, 865-974-1726, rdegenna@utk.edu, or Thomas P. Boehm, AmSouth Scholar and Professor of Finance, Finance Department, 
University of Tennessee, 430 Stokely Management Center, Knoxville, TN 37996-0540, 865-974-1723, tboehm@utk.edu. 
 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta working papers, including revised versions, are available on the Atlanta Fed’s Web site at 
www.frbatlanta.org. Click “Publications” and then “Working Papers.” Use the WebScriber Service (at www.frbatlanta.org) to 
receive e-mail notifications about new papers. 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ATLANTA       WORKING PAPER SERIES 
A Discrete Choice Model of Dividend  
Reinvestment Plans: Classification and Prediction 
 
Thomas P. Boehm and Ramon P. DeGennaro 
 
Working Paper 2007-22 
October 2007 
 
Abstract: We study 852 companies with dividend reinvestment plans in 1999 matched by total assets to 852 
companies without such plans. We use discrete choice methods to predict the classification of these 
companies.  We interpret the misclassified companies as being likely to switch their plan status. That is, if 
a firm’s financial data suggest that a company should have had a dividend reinvestment plan in 1999 but 
did not, then we expect that it would be more likely to institute a plan than the other companies in the 
sample. Conversely, if it did have a plan but the financial data suggest that it should not, then we expect 
that the company would be more likely to drop the plan. We use data from 2004 to explore this conjecture 
and find evidence supporting it. Our model is an economically and statistically reliable predictor of 
changes in plan status. We also identify which variables have the most influence on a company’s decision 
whether or not to offer a plan. 
 
JEL classification: G20, G29, G35 
 
Key words: dividend reinvestment, discrete choice, clustering A Discrete Choice Model of Dividend Reinvestment Plans: 





 Dividend  reinvestment plans (DRIPs) allow investors to reinvest their dividends in 
additional shares of the same stock that paid the dividend.
1  Previous research suggests that firms 
that offer such plans differ from those that do not in systematic ways (DeGennaro, 2003).  Is it 
possible to use financial data to determine whether a firm will or will not offer a plan?  And is it 
possible to take the next step and predict which firms will or will not offer plans in later years?  
The answer to both is yes.  The financial characteristics of companies that offer DRIPs do differ 
from those that do not, and financial traits respond quicker than management can decide to add 
or drop a DRIP and implement that decision.  This has immediate managerial implications as 
well as potential wealth effects for investors.  We also find evidence suggesting that firms 
institute DRIPs to insulate management from control challenges. 
  Our paper is therefore different in substance and in spirit from previous research on 
DRIPs.  For example, some researchers have studied the value of specific plan terms to investors.  
Two important examples are Dammon and Spatt (1992), who calculate the value of an option 
implicit in the share-purchase terms of certain DRIPs, and Scholes and Wolfson (1989), who 
analyze and report the success of their efforts to exploit a price discount provision incorporated 
in other plans.  Another strand of research studies the stock price of companies that announce 
plans (e.g. Dubofsky and Bierman (1988), Perumpral, Keown and Pinkerton (1991) and Dhillon, 
Lasser and Ramirez (1992)).  Still others have explored the interaction of DRIPs and the tax 
code.  Chang and Nichols (1992), for example, investigate whether Internal Revenue Code 
                                                 
1 For a thorough description of these plans and a discussion of why firms offer them, see DeGennaro (2003) and the 
references therein.    - 1 -
Section 305(e) affects qualifying utilities.  They study the cost of equity capital, leverage ratios, 
stock price reactions and participation rates for DRIPs around the time of the changes in the tax 
code.  Todd and Domian (1997) conduct a survey to relate plan characteristics to shareholder 
participation rates.  To our knowledge, though, no research has attempted to predict whether or 
not a company will have a DRIP. 
DRIPs and a more general class of investments, Direct Investment Plans, allow investors 
to avoid investment channels typically used in the past, such as securities brokers.  A DRIP is a 
mechanism that permits shareholders to reinvest their dividends in additional shares 
automatically.  Brokers are not involved unless they are agents of the plan administrator.  If the 
firm does not restrict its plan to current shareholders, then the plan is also what is called a Direct 
Investment Plan, sometimes known as a Super DRIP.  Transactions costs are typically much 
lower than when using traditional brokerage accounts.  For example, share purchases are often 
executed free of charge and sales usually cost just a few cents per share. 
DRIPs are not a different class of security, such as swaps or options.  They are simply a 
new way of selling traditional equity securities.  The privileges and obligations of equity 
ownership are unchanged.  For example, DRIP investors receive the usual mailings and retain all 
voting rights.  Tax implications of share ownership are unaffected, and stock splits are handled 
exactly as if the investor were using a traditional brokerage account. 
Our analysis uses a sample of 852 matched pairs of firms.  The firms are matched on total 
asset size in the base year of observation, 1999.  Each pair of firms contains one company that 
had a DRIP in 1999 and one that did not.  We fit a logistic probability model to the 1999 data to 
determine empirically which specific firm characteristics have an impact on whether or not firms 
have a DRIP.  Based on this model we predict whether or not a firm will change its DRIP status    - 2 -
by 2004.  In general, we find that the dividend yield and several variables capturing a firm’s 
ability to pay dividends, the extent of managerial entrenchment, and industry differentials are 
significant predictors of whether or not a firm has a DRIP.  We are able to predict successfully 
which firms change their DRIP status based on these parameter estimates and firm information 
on the significant factors. 
From the perspective of the financial economist, these data provide information that may 
let us determine the likelihood that companies without plans will adopt one.  Given the results of 
Dubofsky and Bierman (1988), Perumpral, Keown and Pinkerton (1991) and Dhillon, Lasser and 
Ramirez (1992), the ability to predict such an adoption before the marginal investor can do so 
represents a potentially profitable trading opportunity.  The managerial implications are even 
more important:  companies that administer direct investment plans that seek new customers can 
identify firms most likely to be interested in purchasing their services.  The reverse is also 
possible:  they can identify which companies are likely to abandon their plans, helping plan 
administrators concentrate resources on customers that are at greatest risk to become former 
customers.  Predicting changes in plan terms may also be possible. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes our data and outlines our method.  
Section 3 reports summary statistics and univariate results.  Section 4 contains the logistic results 
and Section 5 provides a summary. 
2. Data and Methodology 
Data are from The Guide to Dividend Reinvestment Plans (1999, 2004) and the 
Compustat and CRSP databases.  We begin with 852 firms with available data in 1999 that 
offered DRIPs.  Because DRIP firms tend to be much larger in terms of total assets than 
companies without such plans (DeGennaro, 2003), we match these 852 DRIP companies to a    - 3 -
sample of firms without such plans, for a total of 1704 companies.  We use total assets in 1999 as 
our matching variable. 
Since the dependent variable in our analysis is discrete (1 = company had a DRIP at a 
particular time, 0 otherwise) Ordinary Least Squares regression is inappropriate for two reasons.  
First, because the regression analysis is linear, it is quite possible to estimate probabilities in the 
sample that are outside the (0,1) interval.  In addition, the error terms in such a regression would 
be heteroskedastic.  To avoid these problems we use a maximum likelihood logit model.  This is 
the standard way to handle these problems.  The logit model has the following form: 
PDRIP = 1/ (1 + e
-Xi’βi) ,             ( 1 )  
where:         PDRIP = the probability the firm has a DRIP, 
Xi = a set of variables hypothesized to influence PDRIP, 
βi = a set of coefficients which represent the estimated impact of Xi on PDRIP, 
Xi’βi = β0 + X1β1 + X2β2 + … + Xnβn. 
Classification methods have a long history of productive uses in business and finance.  
These methods include both models that use continuous variables and those that use discrete 
choice variables.  Discrete choice models are probably more common.  One form of discrete 
choice model is cluster analysis.  Shaffer (1991), for example, studies federal deposit insurance 
funding and considers its influence on taxpayers.   
Multinomial logit, another discrete choice approach, has been used at least as far back as 
Holman and Marley (in Luce and Suppes, 1965).  More recent variations include the nested logit 
model of Ben-Akiva (1973), which is designed to handle correlations among alternatives.  
Calhoun and Deng (2000) use multinomial logit models to study loan terminations. 
3. Sample statistics and Univariate Results    - 4 -
Table 1 presents the number of firms in each category partitioned by year and by plan 
status.  In 1999 we have a size-matched sample of 852 companies, one of each pair offering a 
DRIP and one not offering a DRIP, for a total of 1704 companies.  By 2004 the sample has 
shrunk considerably.  Only 916 remain in the sample.
2  Of these, 465 have a plan and 451 do not.  
Of course, this masks movement across groups.  Table 2 shows that most companies maintained 
their plan status, either retaining a plan five years later (387 of 916) or not offering a plan in 
either year (394 of 916).  A moderate number do change their plan status, though.  A total of 71 
companies, or about 7.75%, added a plan within the five years and 64 of the 916, or 6.99%, 
dropped their plans. 
Factors Affecting the Likelihood of Having a DRIP 
 
  Table 3 lists the independent variables included in the analysis.  It also shows whether we 
expect companies that offer DRIPs to have higher or lower values in univariate tests.  Excluding 
total assets (the matching variable) and the categorical industry variables that we include as 
controls, our variables fall into four categories.  These rely on DeGennaro (2003).  We call 
variables in the first category fundamental variables, not in the sense of fundamental economic 
value, but rather because their economic meanings are fundamentally changed by a reinvestment 
plan.  These are the payout ratio and the dividend yield.  Consider two companies which are 
identical except that one has a plan and one does not.  Suppose that the optimal dividend yield is 
4% for both.  The company without a DRIP simply pays a 4% yield.  The DRIP company, 
though, cannot expect plan participants to retain all of their dividends.  The DRIP company must 
offer a higher explicit yield to have an effective yield of 4%.  The same reasoning applies to the 
                                                 
2 Firms leave the sample for the usual reasons:  Merger or other corporate combinations along with delisting due to 
financial distress head the list.     - 5 -
payout ratio.  All else equal, we expect DRIP companies to have higher explicit payout ratios and 
dividend yields. 
  We call variables in the second category maturity variables because they distinguish 
mature companies from growth companies.  In our sample these include net sales, net profit 
margin, the debt ratio, the market-to-book ratio, and the price/earnings ratio (measured at fiscal 
year-end).  Mature companies tend to pay higher dividends (Smith and Watts 1992 and Barclay, 
Smith and Watts 1995).  Although higher dividends are not directly linked to the probability of 
having a DRIP, to the extent that the dividend yield and payout ratio fail to proxy completely for 
maturity, these variables could have predictive power.  In univariate tests the first three of these 
variables should be marginally higher for DRIP companies and the last two, marginally negative 
(DeGennaro 2003).
3 
  We call variables in the third group ability variables because they control for the ability 
to pay dividends – all else equal, firms that earn more can pay more.  These variables are after-
tax return on assets (ROA), after-tax return on common equity (ROE) and earnings per share 
(EPS).  Although the ability to pay dividends is not directly related to the probability of having a 
DRIP, the dividend yield itself is a strong predictor of having a plan.  What do these ability 
variables offer that the yield itself does not?  To the extent that the ability to pay dividends 
affects the dividend yield in the future, these variables contain information about future 
dividends that is not captured by the current yield.  Therefore, the ability variables could provide 
indirect information about the likelihood of having a DRIP in the future. 
  The fourth group controls for managerial entrenchment.  DeGennaro (2003) speculates 
that one reason for the existence of DRIPs is that they can insulate management from threats to 
                                                 
3 Research and development expense is another obvious choice.  We do not use it because it has the most missing 
values by far.  In almost all cases, including it reduces the sample size by more than half.    - 6 -
their control.  Four variables fit this category:  The number of common shareholders, the number 
of common shares outstanding, the number of common shares traded, and the number of 
employees.  First, if management worries about retaining its control, then it prefers a diffuse 
shareholder base with many small shareholders.  If they bother to vote their shares at all, these 
investors are likely to vote with management.  Second, as long as small shareholders do not get a 
large enough position to become activist shareholders, management wants them to have more 
voting shares.  Third, these small shareholders tend to trade less frequently.  Finally, because 
employees’ jobs are often at risk during corporate reorganizations, employees have incentives to 
support current management in takeover battles.  This means that management wants employees 
to be shareholders, too, so companies with many employees are more likely to institute a DRIP 
(sometimes plans have features that are quite favorable to employees and are sometimes even 
restricted to employees).  DRIP companies, therefore, should tend to have higher values for all of 
these variables except for the number of shares traded, which should be lower for DRIP firms. 
Table 4 presents sample statistics for all 1704 companies.  As is to be expected, all 
observations have missing observations for certain variables.  Still, for the sample of 1704 
companies in 1999, we have upwards of 1300 observations for all variables.  Most have more 
than 1550 observations.  Almost all observations on all variables lie within a reasonable range.  
Exceptions occur for certain ratios with denominators near zero.  For example, Compustat 
defines the Payout Ratio as essentially the dollar amount of dividends paid to common 
shareholders divided by earnings.  Because earnings can be near zero, ratios can be large in 
absolute value.  Even these cases, though, are relatively rare. 
Results by DRIP Status    - 7 -
Because we have two time periods and two classes of DRIP status (plan or no plan), we 
have four possible pairs to signify plan status through time.  A company can have a plan in both 
periods, drop a plan, add a plan, or have no plan in either period.  Table 5 reports t-tests of 
differences across these four groups using 1999 data.  We report the results of six combinations 
of plan status.  The first column contains the results of t-tests comparing companies that did not 
have a plan in either year to companies that did have a plan in both years.  We would expect 
these companies to be different, and they are.  Six t-tests are significant, and the signs of all six 
are consistent with our predictions.  In addition, all eight of the insignificant tests have the 
correct sign.  These strong results make sense, because companies that had a plan in both years 
and those that had no plan in either year are the most distinct groups in Table 5. 
The second column contains the results of companies that did not have a plan in either 
year versus companies that added a plan by 2004.  To the extent that the financial data from 1999 
foreshadow this change in plan status, we would expect these classes of companies to differ, and 
they do.  Setting aside the matching variable, Total Assets, seven of the 14 t-tests are statistically 
significant.  Six of these are correctly signed:  The dividend yield, net sales, the debt ratio, the 
number of common shareholders, the number of common shares outstanding, and the number of 
employees are significantly negative, meaning that companies which added plans have higher 
means, which is consistent with Table 3.  The number of common shares traded, though, has a 
negative sign, meaning that companies that institute DRIPs have more shares traded.  All other 
signs are as predicted except for Market-To-Book, P/E at Fiscal Year End, and EPS, and it is 
hard to worry about t-ratios that are under 0.3 in absolute value. 
The third column of Table 5 contains the results of t-tests comparing companies that did 
not have a plan in either year to companies that had a plan in 1999 and dropped it by 2004.  To    - 8 -
the extent that the financial data from 1999 completely foreshadow this change in plan status, we 
would expect these classes of companies to be somewhat similar even as early as 1999.  They 
are.  Only two t-tests are statistically significant and both have the expected signs:  The dividend 
yield and the number of common shareholders.  Consistent with having a plan in 1999, firms that 
would later drop their plans have higher dividend yields and more common shareholders than 
companies that had no plan in either year.  Of the 12 insignificant estimates, 10 have the 
predicted sign. 
The fourth column compares companies that dropped a plan to those that added a plan.  It 
is hard to make predictions about these tests, because all of the companies switched plan status.  
To the extent that these companies’ financial statements reflect either their 1999 status or 
foreshadow their future status, then we might expect significant differences.  However, the 
expected signs of the tests depend on which of those two cases – dropping or adding a plan -- 
dominates.  The only two tests that are significant are the debt ratio and the number of common 
shares traded. 
The fifth column of Table 5 contains the results of t-tests comparing companies that did 
not have a plan in 1999 but added one by 2004 to companies that had a plan in both years.  To 
the extent that financial data from 1999 foreshadow this change to having the same plan status, 
we would expect these classes of companies to be similar.  In contrast, if they have not fully 
adjusted, then they will differ.  In fact, five t-tests (not counting total assets) are significant.  Two 
of these five (ROA and common shares traded) have signs that are consistent with the 1999 plan 
status and the other three (net sales, debt ratio and common shares outstanding) are not.  To the 
extent that the nine insignificant coefficients convey useful information, they support the 
economic reasoning underpinning Table 3 for the 1999 data:  seven have the expected signs.    - 9 -
   The sixth column of Table 5 contains the results of t-tests comparing companies that had 
a plan in 1999 and dropped it by 2004 to companies that had a plan in both years.  If financial 
statements anticipate this change, then we would expect to find differences, and in three cases, 
we do.  All three (net profit margin, debt ratio, and ROA) are consistent with the predictions in 
Table 3.  These results are also consistent with the interpretation that some of these companies 
dropped their plans because they could no longer afford to pay dividends. 
Clearly, the financial statements of companies that have DRIPs differ from those that do 
not.  For our purposes, the point is that these differences hold promise for partitioning the data 
using logit regressions and for predicting DRIP status in the future. 
4. Logit Results 
Table 3 and Table 5 show that certain firm-specific variables systematically differ 
between DRIP firms and no-DRIP firms.  DeGennaro (2003) shows that DRIP firms cluster by 
industry.  Based on this information we estimate this logit regression: 
i j i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i
Industry Emp CST CSout CS EPS ROE
ROA PE MB DR PM NS DY PR TA DRIP
ε β β β β β β β
β β β β β β β β β β
∑ + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + =
22
16 15 14 13 12 11 10
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
 
 
Where the subscript i signifies the company and: 
 
DRIPi = 1 if company i has a DRIP; else 0  ROAi = after-tax return on assets 
TAi = total assets ($MM)  ROEi = after-tax return on common equity 
PRi = payout ratio  EPSi = earnings per share 
DYi = dividend yield  CSi = number of common shareholders 
NSi = net sales ($MM)  CSouti = number of common shares outstanding 
PMi = net profit margin  CSTi = number of common shares traded 
DRi = debt ratio  Empi = number of employees 
MBi = market-to-book ratio  ∑
22
16 Industry j β = seven one-digit SIC codes 
PEi = price/earnings ratio  i ε = logistically distributed i.i.d. error term. 
 
The SIC categories included are:  (1) Mining oil production and consumption, (2) 
Materials and food processing, (3) Manufacturing, (4) Transportation utilities and waste disposal,    - 10 -
(5) Wholesale and retail activity, (6) Financial services, (7) Other services, and (8) Other 
miscellaneous.  It is important to note that the dummy variable that we exclude from the 
regression, “Other services,” includes “medical legal, social and accounting services”.
4     
The first column of Table 6 (Model 1) contains the results using 1999 data.  The top 
number in each cell is the logit coefficient estimate and asymptotic p-values are in parenthesis 
below.  Model 1’s performance is reasonable but less than stellar.  Total assets – the matching 
variable – is insignificant as expected and five of the seven industry effects are significant.  Of 
the other 14 variables, three are significant at the 5% level or better and two just miss, with p-
values under 0.06.  All of these five significant coefficients have the expected signs.  Of the 
remaining nine variables, six have the expected signs.  How can we best interpret these results?  
Analyzing each group of variables is a good starting point.  Three of the variable groups conform 
quite well to our predictions in Table 3.  For example, the two fundamental variables work well.  
The dividend yield is correctly signed and very significant, and the payout ratio is correctly 
signed though insignificant.  Two of the three ability variables are also correctly signed and 
significant, and the incorrectly signed coefficient (ROE) is zero to three decimal places.  The 
likely explanation is that ROE is highly correlated with another variable or combination of 
variables, making it difficult to separate their contributions to explaining variation.  Two of the 
management entrenchment variables, common shares outstanding and common shares traded, are 
correctly signed and significant and the other two are at least correctly signed. 
None of the maturity variables is significant, though.  In univariate analysis, we have 
followed DeGennaro (2003) and argued that DRIP companies are more mature, leading to higher 
sales and margins, and lower research and development expenses.  Mature companies also tend 
to carry more debt, and because they have relatively few growth opportunities they tend to have 
                                                 
4 There are so few in this category that they would not have provided meaningful results.      - 11 -
lower market-to-book and price/earnings ratios.  These arguments lose force in a multivariate 
analysis that includes dividend yields and payout ratios.  Dividend yields and payout ratios 
should be higher for more mature companies.  But these reported values do not included 
reinvestments – after reinvestments, the effective values are lower.  If we matched companies by 
reported dividend yields and payout ratios, then DRIP companies would very likely be less 
mature, because their effective values are lower. 
  This suggests that although dividend yields and payout ratios are positively correlated 
with DRIP status, there is no obvious reason to predict that other traits of mature companies are 
correlated with status once we control for dividend yields and payout ratios.  To the extent that 
dividend yields and payout ratios fail to proxy completely for maturity, then the other maturity 
variables may be marginally positive, but Model 1 shows that these variables can safely be 
eliminated. 
  If we drop the maturity variables from the multivariate analysis, along with ROE, then we 
obtain Model 2.  The results are in the second column of Table 6.  Model 2 gives away virtually 
nothing compared to Model 1.  The pseudo R
2 of 0.3511 is the same to the second decimal place, 
we actually gain two observations, and the coefficient estimates are remarkably similar.  These 
estimates are much more precise in Model 2, though.  First, purists will note that the coefficients 
on EPS and the number of common shares outstanding are now significant at well below the 5% 
level.  In addition, the p-value for the estimate on the number of employees drops from above 
15% to a statistically significant 2.8%.  A likelihood-ratio test formally rejects Model 1 in favor 
of Model 2.  In short, the data support Model 2 much better than Model 1.    - 12 -
  Model 2 correctly classifies companies with DRIPs slightly better than companies 
without them.  For DRIP firms the correct classification rate is 79.33% and for no-DRIP firms 
the rate is 73.54%.  Overall, the rate of correct classifications is 76.73%. 
The Impact of Independent Variable Groups on the Likelihood of Having a DRIP 
Table 7 presents two other ways to gain insight about the implications of Model 2.  Panel 
A reports results for companies with no DRIP in 1999 and Panel B reports results for companies 
with a DRIP in 1999.   The top part of each panel reports the mean predicted probability of 
having a DRIP for companies that had no plans in 2004 (second column) and for companies that 
did have them in 2004 (third column).  The second part of each panel reports the contribution of 
each of the four variable subgroups (fundamental, ability, managerial entrenchment, and industry 
effects) to the difference in the those mean predicted probabilities.  Panel A shows that for firms 
with no DRIP in 1999 the predicted probability of having a DRIP is substantially different 
depending on plan status in 2004.  The 464 companies that did not have a drip in 2004 had a 
predicted mean probability of having a DRIP of 34.73%; whereas the 50 companies that did have 
a DRIP in 2004 had a mean likelihood of having a DRIP of 64.26%.  This difference is not only 
statistically significant (t-statistic of 7.43) but also represents a 29.53 percentage point 
difference.  We interpret this is evidence that the model is picking up factors in the financial 
statements that foreshadow the change in DRIP status. 
This difference in these predicted likelihoods of having a DRIP derives from the 
differences in mean values for the independent variables rather than the estimated coefficients in 
the model.  For example, given the positive coefficient on the payout ratio, a higher payout ratio 
implies that there is a higher probability of having a DRIP.  Thus it is easy to calculate the 
impact of each variable group on this difference between the 34.73% average likelihood and the    - 13 -
64.26% average likelihood of having a DRIP.  In the second part of Panel A in Table 7 we see 
that differences in fundamental variables (16.40 percentage points) are the largest component of 
this differential.  If the mean values for the fundamental variables (payout ratio and dividend 
yield) for no DRIP firms in 2004 are increased to the level of firms that have a DRIP in 2004, 
their predicted likelihood of having a DRIP increases 16.40 percentage points.  This would 
increase the predicted probability of having a DRIP for this group by almost half (a 47.23% 
increase over the 34.73% probability for firms adding a DRIP by 2004).  Of the remaining 
variable groups, managerial entrenchment variables clearly have the largest impact, 6.44 
percentage points (which is 18.54% of the 34.73% probability of firms adding a DRIP by 2004). 
The changes associated with ability and industrial effects variables are relatively small (3.56 and 
3.08 percentage points respectively). 
The importance of managerial entrenchment variables in the decision to add a DRIP 
merits mention because entrenched management has been linked to lower firm value.  Bebchuk 
and Cohen (2005), for example, show that staggered boards (probably the most important 
governance arrangement that insulates managers from dismissal) are associated with lower 
corporate value.  Ryngaert (1988) finds similar (though weaker) results for poison pills.  Future 
research would do well to explore whether companies that institute a DRIP to entrench 
management suffer stock price declines while those that do so for other reasons do not.  This 
might explain the conflicting evidence researchers have found concerning the stock price 
reaction around the announcement that a company will institute a DRIP.  For example, Dubofsky 
and Bierman (1988) and Perumpral, Keown and Pinkerton (1991) find evidence of positive 
abnormal returns when companies announce that they will institute a DRIP while Dhillon, Lasser 
and Ramirez (1992) find evidence of losses.  Peterson, Peterson and Moore (1987) find mixed    - 14 -
results.  Perhaps these latter studies had higher proportions of firms that instituted plans for 
reasons of corporate control.  Estimating abnormal returns after controlling for the reason for 
instituting the DRIP is likely to be fruitful. 
The results for firms that did have a DRIP in 1999 are in Panel B of Table 7.  Again, the 
mean predicted probability of having a DRIP is significantly higher for those firms that retain a 
DRIP in 2004 (third column) compared to those that dropped their DRIP (second column).  The 
difference is 74.64% versus 70.54%, with a t-statistic of 2.68.  Unlike the companies that have a 
DRIP in 1999, though, the variables controlling for the ability to pay dividends drive the 
difference.  The 2.01 percentage point influence is almost double that of any other category of 
variables.  This suggests that firms choose to add or drop DRIPS for substantially different 
reasons.  Companies that add DRIPs tend to have higher payout ratios and dividend yields, and 
higher levels of variables related to managerial entrenchment.  In contrast, companies that drop 
DRIPS do not earn as much and may even need to tap capital markets to raise funds.  If a firm 
does want to reduce dividend payments, then a DRIP works against this.  To see this, suppose 
that a firm has a dividend yield of 5% but because of its DRIP, its effective yield is 1%.  In the 
face of the dividend cut to say, 2% and poor financial performance, some investors will probably 
stop reinvesting.  Other investors who were reinvesting 4% to achieve an effective yield of 1% 
might reinvest only half of the reduced dividend in order to retain their 1% effective yield.  From 
the firm’s perspective these investor responses reduce the effect of the dividend cut.  Because 
operating a plan entails costs, companies may find it simpler just to eliminate the DRIP entirely. 
How Well Can We Predict Changes in Plan Status? 
Consider companies that the logistic model misclassifies; either the model says that they 
should have a plan and they do not, or it says that they should not have a plan and they do.  How    - 15 -
do we interpret this?  One way is to conclude that the model simply fails in such cases.  An 
alternative interpretation is that financial statements contain information about future plan status 
as well as current plan status.  Under this interpretation, misclassified companies are more likely 
to switch their plan status.  That is, if the firm’s financial data suggest that a company should 
have had a dividend reinvestment plan in 1999 but it did not, then we expect that it would be 
more likely to institute a plan than the other companies in the sample.  Conversely, if it did have 
a plan but the financial data suggest that it should not, then we expect that the company would be 
more likely to drop the plan.  Put differently, misclassifications in 1999 include both predictions 
of changes in plan status as well as classification errors. 
Do the data support this interpretation?  The short answer is yes.  We conduct a two-
pronged experiment.  In the first part, we consider companies that have a DRIP in 1999 and 
explore whether or not they drop it by 2004.  In the second part, we consider the companies that 
do not have a DRIP in 1999 and explore whether they add one by 2004.  These two groups of 
firms should have different financial characteristics.  To perform the first part of this experiment 
we partition the 629 companies that had a DRIP in 1999 into those that the logit model correctly 
classifies and those that it misclassifies.  We then compute the proportion of each group that 
dropped their plans by 2004 and test the difference between them.  If the 1999 financial 
statements contain information about future plan status, then the companies that the model 
misclassifies as not having a plan in 1999 should drop their plans significantly more often.  In the 
second part of this experiment we partition the 514 companies that had a DRIP in 1999 into 
those that the logit model correctly classifies and those that it misclassifies.  We compute the 
proportion of each group that added a plan by 2004 and test the difference between them.  If the    - 16 -
1999 financial statements contain information about future plan status, then the companies that 
the model misclassifies as having a plan in 1999 should add plans significantly more often. 
Table 8 reports the results of this experiment.  The top part of Table 8 contains a 
transition matrix that partitions the 629 companies that had DRIPs in 1999 into two groups:  130 
companies that are predicted not to have a DRIP, and 499 companies that are predicted to have a 
DRIP.  Considering actual changes in DRIP status across these two groups between 1999 and 
2004, a significantly higher proportion of those companies predicted not to have a DRIP (t-
statistic of 3.513), in fact do not have a DRIP in 2004 (33.85% versus 21.84%) as compared to 
those firms predicted to have a DRIP.  Thus the predicted probabilities generated from this 
model do allow us to distinguish between those firms that would be more likely to actually 
terminate their program over the next five years and those that would not.  
In the bottom section of Table 8 a similar experiment is conducted for those firms that did 
not have a DRIP in 1999.  The results of this experiment are even more impressive than those for 
firms that initially had a DRIP.  Specifically, of the 514 companies that did not have a DRIP in 
1999, 378 firms were predicted not to have a DRIP.  Of this group only 17 (4.5%) added a DRIP 
by 2004.  This is a significantly lower proportion (t-statistic of -8.95) than that of the 136 firms 
that the model predicted would have a DRIP.  For these companies 24.26% actually added a 
DRIP by 2004.  Once again, the probabilities calculated based on our logit model allow us to 
distinguish between firms that might be expected to adopt a DRIP over a five year observation 
window and those that would not.   
5. Summary 
Most research on dividend reinvestment plans has focused on stock-price responses to the 
announcements of such plans or attempted to value certain plan features.  To date, little research    - 17 -
has attempted to determine which type of firm adopts a plan, and none has attempted to predict 
whether companies will have a plan in the future.  This paper fills that void.  We use discrete 
choice methods to predict the classification of 1704 companies:  A sample of 852 companies 
with dividend reinvestment plans in 1999 matched by total assets to a sample of 852 companies 
without such plans.  We develop a logit model that successfully classifies almost 77% of 
companies yet uses only readily available contemporaneous financial data.  Our analysis 
demonstrates that in addition to the dividend yield, variables measuring ability to pay dividends, 
managerial entrenchment, and industry differentials all have a significant influence on the 
likelihood that a firm has a DRIP.  In addition, by interpreting the misclassified companies as 
those being likely to switch their plan status, we can then test whether the model can predict 
changes in plan status.  The underlying premise is that a company’s current financial data contain 
information not only about whether a company currently has a dividend reinvestment plan, but 
also that they contain information about future plan status.  We use data from 1999 and 2004 to 
explore this conjecture.  We find that our model can predict changes in plan status even as much 
as five years in the future. 
Our results are important for at least three reasons.  First, the ability to predict changes in 
plan status before the marginal investor can do so represents a potentially profitable trading 
opportunity (Dubofsky and Bierman, 1988 and Perumpral, Keown and Pinkerton, 1991).  
Second, companies that administer direct investment plans that seek new customers can produce 
a list of firms most likely to be interested in purchasing their services, thus saving time and 
resources.  The reverse is also possible:  we can improve our predictions of which companies are 
likely to abandon their plans, and plan administrators can improve their predictions about which 
customers are at greatest risk to become former customers.  Finally, we find that variables    - 18 -
controlling for managerial entrenchment are highly correlated with the decision to institute a 
dividend reinvestment plan.  This is the first empirical evidence that dividend reinvestment plans 
might serve to insulate management from outside control.     - 19 -
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Number of firms by year and plan status 
 









1999  852 852  1704 








Plan status of the 916 surviving firms in 1999 and 2004 
 
Plan Status in  





Neither 1999 nor 2004  387 42.25% 
Not 1999 but 2004  71 7.75% 
1999 but not 2004  64 6.99% 
Both 1999 and 2004  394 43.01% 
Total Surviving Companies  916 100% 
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Table 3 
Expected relation between financial statement data for companies with DRIPs 




Companies with DRIPs tend to 
have higher or lower values? 
Total Assets  N/A (matching variable) 
Fundamental Variables   
Payout Ratio  Higher 
Dividend Yield  Higher 
Maturity Variables   
Net Sales  Higher 
Net Profit Margin  Higher 
Debt Ratio  Higher 
Market-To-Book Ratio  Lower 
P/E at Fiscal Year End  Lower 
Ability Variables   
After Tax Return on Total Assets  Higher 
After Tax Return on Common Equity  Higher 
Earnings Per Share  Higher 
Managerial Entrenchment Variables   
Number of Common Shareholders  Higher 
Number of Common Shares Outstanding  Higher 
Number of Common Shares Traded  Lower 
Number of Employees  Higher    - 23 -
Table 4 
Sample Statistics, 1999 Data, 1704 Firms in Operation in 1999 
 
Variable N  Mean  Std  Dev  Min.  Max. 
     Total Assets ($MM)  1703 14,648  47,081    9.06   575,167
Fundamental Variables          
     Payout Ratio (%)  1649 35.02   168.52   -3626.04   3192.31
     Dividend Yield (%)   1576 2.55   3.36   0  48.32
Maturity Variables      
     Net Sales ($MM)  1700 5444.4   13,451   0  173,215
     Net Profit Margin (%)  1700 4.21   45.19   -1324.84   371.10
     Debt Ratio  1703 0.69   0.230   0.0032   2.741
     Market To Book  1565 2.97  9.06    -238.17    121.53
     P/E at Fiscal Year End  1578 18.21   104.0   -1693.80   1437.50
Ability Variables    
     After Tax Return on Total Assets (%)  1704 2.65   8.87   -117.33   48.15
     After Tax Return on Common Equity (%)  1694 4.79  184.73   -6812.12   565.89
     Earnings Per Share ($)  1621 1.69  9.38   -51.66   276.02
Managerial Entrenchment Variables    
     Common Shareholders (M)  1303 38.14   161.69   0  4206.32
     Common Shares Outstanding (MM)  1657 198.80   468.90   0  6133.40
     Common Shares Traded (MM/yr.)  1574 168.98  525.61    0  8129.69
     Employees (M)  1526 21.91  55.61    0  1140.0
Industry Effects Variables      
     Mining, Oil, and Construction   1704 0.03 0.18  0  1 
     Materials Processing  1704 0.15 0.36  0  1 
     Manufacturing  1704 0.17 0.37  0  1 
     Transportation, Utilities, and Waste Disposal  1704 0.17  0.38  0  1 
     Wholesale and Retail  1704 0.07 0.25  0  1 
     Financial Services  1704 0.31 0.46  0  1 
     Other Services  1704 0.06 0.24  0  1 
     Medical, Legal, Management Accounting Services  1704 0.01 0.12  0  1 
     Other Miscellaneous  1704 0.01 0.08  0  1    - 24 -
Table 5 
















     Total Assets ($MM)  -0.17 -2.03* -0.84  0.67  2.35*  0.89 
Fundamental Variables        
     Payout Ratio (%)  -2.45* -1.48  -1.18  0.36  0.60  0.19 
     Dividend Yield (%)  -10.1** -3.30** -4.68** -0.88 -1.94 -0.40 
Maturity Variables        
     Net Sales ($MM)  -2.09* -4.51** -1.55  1.59  2.35*  0.01 
     Net Profit Margin (%)  -2.81** -0.93 -0.41  1.16 -0.97  -2.66** 
     Debt Ratio  -1.06 -2.40* 1.33 3.26**  2.32* -2.27* 
     Market To Book  0.07 -0.30 0.14 1.29 1.55 -0.59 
     P/E at Fiscal Year End  0.83 -0.07 0.99 0.94 0.63 -0.77 
Ability Variables        
     After Tax Return On Total Assets (%)  -4.67** -0.60 -0.79 -0.26  -2.42*  -1.99* 
     After Tax Return on Common Equity (%)  -1.20 -0.51 -0.39 0.26 -0.18 -0.28 
     Earnings Per Share ($)  -0.22 0.04 0.19 0.74 -0.61 -1.33 
Managerial Entrenchment Variables        
     Common Shareholders (M)  -2.70** -3.32** -3.17** 0.12 -0.09 -0.16 
     Common Shares Outstanding (MM)  -1.45 -3.58** -1.80  0.74  2.18*  0.80 
     Common Shares Traded (MM/yr.)  0.38 -2.32* 1.59 2.21*  2.60** -1.44 
     Employees (M)  -1.64 -3.37** -1.02  1.39  1.40  0.14 
Degrees of freedom for the t-tests range 













t-test code:    NN = No DRIP in either 1999 or 2004 
    NY = No DRIP in 1999 but DRIP in 2004 
    YN = DRIP in 1999 but no DRIP in 2004 
    YY = DRIP in both 1999 and 2004  
 
The two pairs of letters represent the groups in a t-test for equal means.  For example, the 
statistics in the column headed NN v NY report the results of t-tests for the sample of firms that 
had no DRIP in either 1999 or 2004 versus the sample that did not have a DRIP in 1999 but did 
have a DRIP in 2004.  A positive test statistic means that the first-named class has the higher 
mean. 
 
* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
** indicates significance at the 1% level.    - 25 -
Table 6 
Logit Results, 1999 Data 
i j i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i
Industry Emp CST CSout CS EPS ROE
ROA PE MB DR PM NS DY PR TA DRIP
ε β β β β β β β
β β β β β β β β β β
∑ + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + =
22
16 15 14 13 12 11 10
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2 




     Total Assets (MM$)  -0.0000 
(0.321) 
 
Fundamental Variables    








Maturity Variables    
     Net Sales ($MM)  0.0000 
(0.867) 
 
     Net Profit Margin (%)  -0.0014 
(0.658) 
 
     Debt Ratio  0.6276 
(0.124) 
 
     Market To Book  0.0105 
(0.412) 
 
     P/E at Fiscal Year End  0.0000 
(0.954) 
 
Ability Variables    




     After Tax Return on Common Equity (%) -0.0001 
(0.960) 
 




Managerial Entrenchment Variables    
















Industry Effects Variables    
     Mining, Oil, and Construction   0.9866* 
(0.023) 
0.9312* 
(0.029)    - 26 -








     Transportation, Utilities, and Waste 

















    
Pseudo R
2 0.3549  0.3511 
Number of observations  1141 1143 
 
Asymptotic p-values in parentheses.  The dependent variable is unity if a 
firm had a DRIP in 1999 and zero if it did not.   
 
* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Proportion of firms correctly classified:  76.73%.    - 27 -
 
Table 7 
Mean Probabilities of Drip 
and  
Impact of Variable Group Changes 
1999 Data 
Panel A: 
Companies with No Drip in 1999 
  No Drip in 2004  Drip in 2004 
Predicted Probability of having a DRIP  34.73%  64.26% 
Number of Observations  464  50 
t-statistic for Difference in Means  7.43**   
     
  Change in No Drip versus Drip in 2004 
Pr(Drip in '04 | No Drip in '99) 
 Percentage  Point
†  % of Total 
Fundamental Variables  16.40  47.23% 
Ability Variables  3.56  10.25% 
Managerial Entrenchment Variables  6.44  18.54% 
Industrial Effects Variables  3.08  8.08% 
Panel B: 
Companies with Drip in 1999 
  No Drip in 2004  Drip in 2004 
Predicted Probability of having a DRIP  70.54%  74.64% 
Number of Observations  150  479 
t-statistic for Difference in Means  2.68**   
 
  Change in No Drip versus Drip in 2004 
Pr(Drip in '04 | Drip in '99) 
 Percentage  Point
†  % of Total 
Fundamental Variables  1.09  1.55% 
Ability Variables  2.01  2.84% 
Managerial Entrenchment Variables  0.57  0.81% 
Industrial Effects Variables  0.82  1.16% 
    
† the individual percentage point changes do not sum exactly to the total probability differential because 
of the non-linear (logit) form of the probability calculations.  
** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A reports results for companies with no DRIP in 1999 and Panel B reports results for companies with a DRIP 
in 1999.   The top part of each panel reports the mean predicted probability of having a DRIP for companies that had 
no plans in 2004 (second column) and for companies that did have them in 2004 (third column).  The second part of 
each panel reports the contribution of each of the four variable subgroups (fundamental, ability, managerial 
entrenchment, and industry effects) to the difference in the those mean predicted probabilities.    - 28 -
Table 8 
Transition Matrix using 1999 data to predict DRIP status in 2004 
 
Companies That Had a DRIP in 1999 
 Predicted  not  to 
have DRIP in 1999 
Predicted to have 
DRIP in 1999 
 
Total 
Number of Observations  130  499  629 
Number that had DRIP in 2004  86  393  479 
Proportion that still had DRIP in 2004  66.15%  78.76%   










Proportion that no longer had DRIP in 








Companies That Did Not Have a DRIP in 1999 
 
 
Predicted not to 
have DRIP in 1999 
Predicted to have  
DRIP in 1999 
 
Total 
Number of Observations  378  136  514 
Number that Did Not Have DRIP in 2004  361  103  464 
Proportion that did not have DRIP in 2004  95.50%  75.74%   
Number that had DRIP in 2004 
17 












** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
      
 
The top section of the table reports the transition data for the 629 companies that had a DRIP in 1999.  The logit 
model predicts that 130 of these companies should not have a DRIP.  Alternatively, the model predicts that 499 
firms should have a DRIP.  Considering actual changes in DRIP status by 2004, a significantly higher (t-statistic of 
3.513) portion of firms predicted not to have a DRIP in fact do not have one in 2004 (33.85% versus 21.84%) as 
compared to firms predicted to have one. 
 
The bottom section of the table conducts a comparable experiment for companies that did not have a DRIP in 1999.  
Of the 514 companies that did not have a DRIP in 1999, 378 were predicted by the logit model not to have a DRIP, 
while 136 were predicted to have a DRIP.  Again, considering actual changes in DRIP status by 2004, a significantly 
lower proportion (t-statistic of -8.965) of firms predicted not to have a DRIP added a DRIP in 2004 (4.50% versus 
24.26%) as compared to firms predicted to have one. 